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PROFESSOR JUSTICE GINSBURG: JUSTICE GINSBURG’S 
LOVE OF PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION 
Zachary D. Tripp* & Gillian E. Metzger** 
As two of Justice Ginsburg’s former clerks, we are keenly aware of the 
popular image of the Justice as the “Notorious RBG”: the champion of 
women’s rights and the forceful dissenter, strongly disputing the Roberts 
Court’s conservative turn and articulating the case for the liberal New Deal 
constitutional vision, with its commitment to protecting individual rights 
and broad view of national power. 
This she did, powerfully and eloquently. But to understand Justice 
Ginsburg—the person, the Justice, and her jurisprudence—it is also criti-
cal to account for her role as the Supreme Court’s leading civil procedure 
and federal jurisdiction maven. 
Justice Ginsburg had a deep and abiding love for these foundational 
(but less flashy) parts of the legal system. Before becoming a judge, she 
had been a professor of civil procedure and had even written a book about 
Swedish civil procedure.1 And as a Justice, these subjects continued to 
bring her great joy. She often asked the first question in procedure and 
jurisdictional cases—and indeed often dominated the oral arguments 
through her incisive and frequent questioning. Anyone who wants to hear 
the Justice at her feistiest need only listen to the oral arguments in a few 
procedure or jurisdiction cases, like Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court 
or Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.2 
Justice Ginsburg also eagerly sought out assignments to write the opin-
ions in these cases. She would return from conference with a big smile on 
her face when she succeeded in landing such an assignment, looking very 
much like the cat that ate the cream. And succeed she often did. Over her 
twenty-seven years on the Court, Justice Ginsburg issued more than eighty 
decisions touching on all aspects of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction.3 
                                                                                                                           
 *  Partner and Co-Head of the Appellate Practice Group, Weil, Gotshal & Manges 
LLP. Mr. Tripp clerked for Justice Ginsburg in October Term 2007. 
 **  Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia Law School. 
Professor Metzger clerked for Justice Ginsburg in October Term 1997. Special thanks to 
Freya Jamison, Warren Chu, and Geoff Xiao for excellent research assistance. 
 1. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Anders Bruzelius, Civil Procedure in Sweden (1965). 
 2. E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 
S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466), 2017 WL 1482003; Transcript of Oral Argument, Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (No. 08-1008), 2009 
WL 3554562 [hereinafter Shady Grove Oral Argument Transcript]. 
 3. By our count, recognizing that classifying cases is an art and not a science, 34% 
(73) of Justice Ginsburg’s 213 majority opinions for the Court centered on issues of 
procedure or jurisdiction. See Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: Justice Ginsburg Leaves 
a Lasting Legacy on the Court, SCOTUSblog (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.scotus 
blog.com/2020/09/empirical-scotus-justice-ginsburg-leaves-a-lasting-legacy-on-the-court 
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Among others, she wrote leading (or, in Ginsburgese, “pathmarking”4) 
decisions on what constitutes a “jurisdictional” rule,5 personal jurisdiction,6 
the requirements for class certification,7 and preclusion.8 In turn, Justice 
Ginsburg’s absence will be sorely felt in these areas. As Justice Kavanaugh 
recently commented at oral argument, “[Y]ou know, it’s never good to be 
on the wrong side of a Justice Ginsburg opinion, but particularly on a 
jurisdictional issue.”9 
These opinions, often unanimous or nearly so, were as much para-
digms of the Ginsburg style as her vaunted dissents. Carefully crafted and 
spare, with no unnecessary tangents, they invariably seek to clarify and 
remove confusion on procedural matters for lower court judges. Indeed, 
many of these decisions have a strong teaching quality. For example, her 
many decisions in the Arbaugh line of cases bring clarity to the task of 
federal district court judges by ending loose uses (and misuses) of the term 
“jurisdictional.” As she said for the Court, again and again, jurisdiction is 
“a word of many, too many, meanings,”10 and her decisions help to elimi-
nate the resulting confusion and in turn to clarify what questions a judge 
must answer even if not raised by the litigants. Her decisions in the Goodyear 
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/4W6X-CTKV] (identifying Justice Ginsburg as writing 213 majority 
opinions). This heavy procedural and jurisdictional cast of the Justice’s jurisprudence was 
present throughout her time on the Court. See David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First 
Decade: Some Thoughts About Her Contributions in the Fields of Procedure and 
Jurisdiction, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 21, 21 (2004) (noting that “approximately fifty” of 
Ginsburg’s “some two hundred opinions” after ten years on the Court “deal[t] in whole or 
in part with issues of civil procedure and/or federal jurisdiction”). 
 4. “Pathmarking” was one of the Justice’s favorite and most distinctive terms. Her 
“pathmarking” use of “pathmarking” in the Supreme Court was in dissent in International 
Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 844 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part). She appears to have coined the term early in her tenure at the D.C. 
Circuit. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (referring to a “path-
marking decision”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Work of Professor Allan Delker Vestal, 70 
Iowa L. Rev. 13, 13 (1984) (“Professor Vestal made many vibrant contributions to the law. 
His pathmarking work involved the law of prior adjudication.”). Justice Ginsburg explained 
that the term was a tribute to a book by the Swedish diplomat, Dag Hammarskjöld. See Dag 
Hammarskjöld, Markings (Leif Sjöberg & W.H. Auden trans., Faber & Faber 1964); see also 
Adam Liptak, Kagan Says Her Path to Supreme Court Was Made Smoother by Ginsburg’s, 
N.Y. Times (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/us/kagan-says-her-
path-to-supreme-court-was-made-smoother-by-ginsburg.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
 5. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 6. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 7. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 8. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). 
 9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 65, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Balt., No. 19-1189 (U.S. 
argued Jan. 19, 2021), 2021 WL 177489. 
 10. E.g., Fort Bend County. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2019); Sebelius v. Auburn 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 81 
(2009); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510; Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004). 
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line of cases similarly bring clarity to lower court judges, and especially 
state court judges, who had often blurred the lines between general (“all 
purposes”) and specific (or “case-linked”) jurisdiction, in ways that Justice 
Ginsburg explained were spurious.11 And her decision in Taylor v. Sturgell 
is effectively a textbook treatment of issue preclusion, eliminating 
confusion about when it is appropriate to bind a nonparty.12 
Like her Notorious dissents, her decisions in civil procedure and 
jurisdiction cases share a pragmatic focus on law on the ground and a 
commitment to judicial modesty. But they stand out for their attentiveness 
to doctrinal and institutional interstices over abstract principle. This 
nuanced approach, along with her deep understanding of the limited 
judicial role, sometimes led to surprising results. Among other things, 
these decisions articulate a different account of federalism than her 
dissents alone convey—one that puts pride of place on federal–state 
comity and accommodation, even while acknowledging the dominance of 
federal law. 
I. PRAGMATISM, LOWER COURT DEFERENCE, AND CLARITY 
Justice Ginsburg’s presence looms particularly large in less high-profile, 
even somewhat quotidian cases that nonetheless set essential parameters 
of federal court jurisdiction and the relationship between the federal and 
state courts. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on removal from state to 
federal court over the last twenty-seven years, for example, was often 
crafted by the Justice.13 She also almost singlehandedly redefined what it 
means for a given statutory limit on bringing claims to be “jurisdictional,” 
apparently succeeding through her dogged determination in bringing the 
Court around to her view that most such limits were simply claims-
processing rules that could be waived or forfeited, even if they were 
mandatory and thus admitted of no exceptions.14 
                                                                                                                           
 11. E.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125–39; 
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923–29. 
 12. 553 U.S. 880 (2008). 
 13. E.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014); 
Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006); Lincoln Prop. Co. v. 
Roche, 546 U.S. 81 (2005); Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999); Murphy Bros. v. 
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999); Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470 
(1998); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996); Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. 
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996). 
 14. See, e.g., supra note 10 (collecting cases). Bowles v. Russell, which held that the 
statutory time limits in 28 U.S.C. § 2107 for filing a notice of appeal in a civil case are 
jurisdictional, represents the only notable decision in which the Justice’s view lost out. 551 
U.S. 205 (2007). But the Court (per Justice Ginsburg) has since made clear that the Bowles 
exception is narrowly confined, apparently limited to Section 2107 alone. See, e.g., Hamer 
v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 21 (2017). 
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Frequently unanimous, these opinions demonstrate her colleagues’ 
recognition of Justice Ginsburg’s deep knowledge on questions of proce-
dure and jurisdiction. They also reveal the Justice’s intensely pragmatic 
approach. These opinions share an insistent focus on what makes sense on 
the ground rather than abstract conceptual distinctions. As Professors 
Scott Dodson and David Franklin have separately argued, this focus also 
animated the Justice’s concerns for judicial economy and her faith in the 
discretion of the lower court judge.15 For example, her repeated efforts to 
treat time limitations as mandatory but waivable (rather than strictly 
“jurisdictional” and thus nonwaivable) help to avoid the considerable 
waste of judicial resources that would arise if judges were constantly forced 
to answer questions no litigant put to them.16 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinions in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil 
Co.17 and Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp.18 
are of a similar ilk. In both, the Justice rejected formalistic claims of juris-
dictional priority—refusing to demand that district courts undertake diffi-
cult determinations of subject matter jurisdiction before more efficiently 
dismissing cases on other nonmerits grounds (namely, personal jurisdiction 
or forum non conveniens). Instead, she left to the district court’s 
discretion the choice of which threshold basis for dismissal should come 
first, simply instructing that courts should dismiss on the basis of subject 
matter jurisdiction when they can readily do so without unnecessary 
burden.19 
II. COMMITMENT TO JUDICIAL MODESTY 
Justice Ginsburg’s strong views about process norms—and her 
abiding sense of judicial modesty—could also take priority over substantive 
doctrinal concerns. Take, for example, one of the Justice’s last opinions, 
United States v. Sineneng-Smith.20 Sineneng-Smith came to the Supreme Court 
with many of the hallmarks of a controversial Trump Administration 
immigration case—and also an expectation from many that Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 15. Scott Dodson, A Revolution in Jurisdiction, in The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
137 (Scott Dodson ed., 2015); David L. Franklin, Justice Ginsburg’s Common-Law 
Federalism, 43 New Eng. L. Rev. 751 (2009). 
 16. Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849–50 (2019); Arbaugh v. Y & H 
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510–11, 513–16 (2006). 
 17. 526 U.S. 574 (1999). 
 18. 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
 19. Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 435–36 (finding that the district court properly 
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds rather than expending resources on more 
complicated subject matter and personal jurisdictional determinations); Ruhrgas AG, 526 
U.S. at 587–88 (“Where . . . a district court has before it a straightforward personal 
jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect in 
subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its 
discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction.”). 
 20. 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020). 
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Ginsburg would vote in favor of the criminal defendant.21 Instead, Justice 
Ginsburg completely recast the case in process terms and wrote an opinion 
for a unanimous Supreme Court on the side of the government and 
sharply rebuking the Ninth Circuit. 
Evelyn Sineneng-Smith was an immigration consultant who ran a 
fraudulent scheme in which she duped her mainly Filipino clients into 
paying her thousands of dollars to file applications for a program that 
would allow them to obtain lawful status, notwithstanding that she knew 
the program deadline had long passed and the applications would go 
nowhere.22 The government charged and convicted her on multiple 
counts, including for violating a statutory prohibition on “encouraging or 
inducing” an alien to unlawfully enter or remain in the United States for 
commercial advantage or private financial gain.23 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit sua sponte asked for briefing on whether 
the restriction on “encouraging or inducing” an alien to remain unlaw-
fully in the United States was facially unconstitutional. After supplemental 
briefing and argument, the Ninth Circuit struck down the statute as facially 
overbroad.24 It determined that the statute criminalized “the simple 
words—spoken to a son, a wife, a parent, a friend, a neighbor, a coworker, 
a student, a client—‘I encourage you to stay here,’” as well as social media 
posts or a “speech addressed to a gathered crowd” encouraging those 
without legal status to remain.25 According to the appeals court, the statute 
would allow a felony prosecution of “an attorney who tells her client that 
she should remain in the country while contesting removal,” even if that 
was good faith legal advice.26 And the Ninth Circuit’s list of hypotheticals 
were almost certainly magnified by the panel’s fears that the Trump 
Administration would use aggressive prosecutions under Section 1324(a) 
as a weapon to crack down on illegal immigration and pro-immigration 
advocacy or charity work. 
The government sought certiorari and the Supreme Court granted 
the petition to decide whether the statute was facially unconstitutional.27 
                                                                                                                           
 21. Of course, Justice Ginsburg often broke from such conventional expectations. For 
example, in Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018), a criminal case involving 
wiretaps, the conventional expectation would have been that Justice Ginsburg would favor 
the defendant and be skeptical of the government’s broad use of wiretap authority. Instead, 
at the oral argument, she immediately interrupted the defense counsel’s opening with a 
series of difficult questions that made clear she fully agreed with the government’s position. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–5, Dahda, 138 S. Ct. 1491 (No. 17-43), 2018 WL 
1015564. With her strong support in hand, the government won unanimously. 
 22. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1577–78. 
 23. Id. at 1578; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (B)(i) (2018). 
 24. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 467–68 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 25. Id. at 465, 484. 
 26. Id. at 484. 
 27. Mr. Tripp represented the government in filing its petition for a writ of certiorari 
but left the Office of the Solicitor General before the petition was granted. 
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At the Court, the government’s main strategy was to argue that the provi-
sion was narrower than the Ninth Circuit believed and was a “conventional 
prohibition on soliciting or facilitating” unlawful activity that fell within 
the well-settled First Amendment exception for “speech integral to criminal 
conduct.”28 In response, Sineneng-Smith contended that the Ninth Circuit’s 
broad interpretation was compelled by the ordinary meaning of “encourage 
or induce,” with the result that the provision could not fit within the 
exception and instead raised grave First Amendment concerns.29 The oral 
argument proceeded along the same lines, with the Justices posing 
difficult questions to each side about the scope of the statute and the 
“speech integral to crime” exception and whether or to what extent 
Congress can punish solicitation of underlying activity that is unlawful but 
not itself a crime.30 
The case thus appeared poised to be a test of the competing visions 
of the statute, as well as a vehicle for resolving some thorny questions of 
First Amendment doctrine. Instead, perhaps at the Justices’ conference a 
few days after argument, Justice Ginsburg completely recast the case. The 
Ninth Circuit’s real mistake, the Justice held, was to take over litigation of the 
case from the parties in order to answer a completely different question from any the 
parties had actually asked. 
“In our adversarial system of adjudication,” she explained, “we follow 
the principle of party presentation,” meaning that “‘we rely on the parties 
to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral 
arbiter of matters the parties present.’”31 According to the Justice, 
“[C]ourts are essentially passive instruments of government”: “They ‘do 
not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. [They] 
wait for cases to come to [them], and when [cases arise, courts] normally 
decide only questions presented by the parties.’”32 Justice Ginsburg con-
cluded that “the Ninth Circuit’s radical transformation of this case”—
including sua sponte inviting briefing from three specific immigrants’ 
rights groups and allocating those hand-picked counsel more argument 
                                                                                                                           
 28. Brief for the United States at 18, 31–32, Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (No. 19-67), 
2019 WL 6524882; see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (listing 
“speech integral to criminal conduct” among the limitations on speech traditionally 
tolerated under the First Amendment). 
 29. Brief for Respondent at 14, Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (No. 19-67), 2020 WL 
257581. 
 30. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (No. 19-67). 
 31. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1579 (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 
243 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.)). 
 32. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 
(8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en banc)). Justice Ginsburg quoted 
the same passage in Greenlaw. 554 U.S. at 244. One of the highlights of Mr. Tripp’s clerkship 
was working with Justice Ginsburg on the opinion in Greenlaw and, in particular, finding 
that quote. The Justice had tremendous respect for Judge Arnold, and that passage 
encapsulated the point in elegant prose much like the Justice’s own writing. When she first 
read it, the Justice responded with a huge smile, which was the highest compliment. 
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time than Sineneng-Smith’s own counsel—“depart[ed] so drastically from 
the principle of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”33 
Sineneng-Smith thus came as a big surprise, but in many respects it is a 
quintessential Justice Ginsburg opinion. Like all of her opinions, it is crisp, 
concise, and beautifully written. It displays her well-refined sense of legal 
process and the appropriate judicial role. Through the opinion, the Justice 
teaches the reader (and lower courts) about the “party presentation” prin-
ciple34—a principle that is familiar in the abstract but rarely discussed or 
used as the basis for deciding an appeal. Like many of her process 
opinions, it is unanimous, with all the other Justices ultimately embracing 
Justice Ginsburg’s understanding of the Ninth Circuit’s error. And it 
vividly demonstrates how those process values and commitment to passive 
virtues would take priority for Justice Ginsburg over substantive concerns 
like statutory interpretation or First Amendment doctrine. Indeed, in 
Sineneng-Smith, Justice Ginsburg did not merely arrive at the correct pro-
cedural answer but apparently was the first even to conceive of the case in those 
terms. None of the parties had discussed the party-presentation principle 
or cited the leading case, the Justice’s own prior opinion in Greenlaw. 
The irony of Sineneng-Smith is that, after sternly reprimanding the 
Ninth Circuit for deciding the case on the basis of an argument that no 
party had raised, the Supreme Court proceeded to turn around and do 
the same. Justice Ginsburg was clearly aware of the concern, going so far 
as to include an appendix of the many situations in which the Supreme 
Court has requested supplemental briefing or appointed amici.35 She 
distinguished such actions on the grounds that courts are not “hidebound 
by the precise arguments of counsel” and “[t]he party presentation 
principle is supple, not ironclad.”36 Nonetheless, there were limits, and the 
Justice was unapologetic in holding that the Ninth Circuit’s dramatic steps 
to take control of the litigation, reframe and broaden the issues, and strike 
down a federal statute on its face went “well beyond the pale.”37 Justice 
Ginsburg’s decision for the Court, by contrast, merely returned the case 
to its original, more mundane form. 
                                                                                                                           
 33. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1578, 1581–82. 
 34. Id. at 1579. 
 35. See id. at 1582–83. Some commentors have suggested that the Supreme Court has 
been more willing to reach out beyond the parties for arguments in recent years. E.g., Henry 
M. Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 Colum. 
L. Rev. 665 (2012). 
 36. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1579, 1581. 
 37. Id. at 1581–82. 
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III. “COMPLEMENTARY SYSTEMS FOR ADMINISTERING JUSTICE”38 
The Justice’s voice stands out especially in cases involving complex 
interactions between federal and state courts. The same traits of pragma-
tism, lower court deference, and judicial modesty are evident, but the 
driving force is the Justice’s view of the federal and state courts as two 
essential and “complementary systems for administering justice in our 
Nation.”39 “Cooperation and comity, not competition and conflict,” the 
Justice emphasized, “are essential to the federal design.”40 Three of the 
Justice’s opinions depict her vision particularly well. 
The first two, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities41 and Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,42 involve the same general 
question: Whether a given state rule would apply to an action governed by 
state substantive law but heard in federal court because the plaintiffs and 
defendants are from different states and thus satisfy the requirements for 
federal court diversity jurisdiction. After struggling with this question for 
many years in the aftermath of Erie Railroad Company v. Tomkins,43 the 
Supreme Court set out a deceptively simple solution: “[F]ederal courts are 
to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”44 This means 
that federal courts should enforce any applicable Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) that is rationally viewed as procedural; otherwise, 
federal courts should apply the relevant state rule when doing so would 
advance Erie’s twin goals of avoiding inequitable variation in results 
between federal and state courts and limiting forum shopping.45 Although 
providing good guideposts in the “mine run”46 of cases, this approach 
                                                                                                                           
 38. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586 (1999). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 42. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 43. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 44. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). 
 45. Id. at 468, 470, 472. 
 46. “Mine run,” used instead of the more common “run of the mill,” is another 
distinctive Ginsburg phrase. See, e.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 
574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014) (referring to “mine-run diversity cases”); Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., 
LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 385 (2012) (referring to “mine-run TCPA claims”); Sinochem Int’l Co. 
v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007) (arguing that “[i]n the mine run 
of cases, jurisdiction ‘will involve no arduous inquiry’” (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon 
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587 (1999))). The Justice first employed “mine run” in the Supreme 
Court in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996), but had used it in the D.C. Circuit and 
her academic writing long before. See Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 
119 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (referring to “the mine run of litigation”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Special Findings and Jury Unanimity in the Federal Courts, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 256, 258 
(1965) (“run of the mine cases”). Even Marty Ginsburg used the phrase, perhaps a sign of 
the Justice’s editing. See Martin D. Ginsburg, Rethinking the Tax Law in the New 
Installment Sales World, 59 Taxes 886, 891 (1981). At both the Supreme Court and the D.C. 
Circuit, however, somebody else beat Justice Ginsburg to the punch. See Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167, 222 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Am. Sec. Council Ed. Found. v. Fed. 
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leaves open what federal courts should do when the import of a federal 
rule is unclear, or when the relevant state and federal rules appear to be 
heavily substantive as well as procedural. 
Gasperini involved a New York law allowing an appellate court to 
review the size of a jury verdict and order a new trial when the appellate 
court determines that the verdict deviates materially from what would be 
reasonable compensation.47 The Court was confronted with the question 
of whether the state law, despite its ostensible manifestation as a proce-
dural rule of review, was in fact a substantive requirement that ought to 
apply in a federal court diversity action under Erie. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Ginsburg first concluded that the state requirement was substan-
tive, and then confronted the trickier question of whether it could be 
squared with the Seventh Amendment’s general prohibition on reexamining 
jury trial determinations in federal courts.48 The Justice’s response was to 
pull apart two aspects of jury trial reexamination: the long-established 
ability of federal district courts to grant a new trial and the far less settled 
ability of a federal appellate court to set aside a jury verdict as excessive. 
She concluded that the state’s “dominant interest can be respected, with-
out disrupting the federal system, by . . . recognizing that the federal 
district court” can apply New York’s law requiring review of jury verdicts.49 
In short, sensitive to the distinct positions of appellate and district courts 
in the federal system, the Justice offered a contextualized approach that 
“accommodate[d]” the “principal state and federal interests” involved by 
reinforcing the role of the district court judge.50 And to reach that result 
“[s]he threaded her way through [a] maze” of Erie precedents and 
procedural rules “with all the skill of Theseus conquering the intricacies 
of the Labyrinth.”51 
Fast forward nearly fifteen years, and the Court was confronted with a 
similar problem in Shady Grove. At issue was another New York law, this 
one prohibiting litigants from bringing class actions to recover statutory 
penalties.52 Nonetheless, seeking to recover statutory penalties under New 
York law in a diversity action in federal court, a plaintiff claimed the right 
to proceed in a class action form by virtue of the authorization of class 
actions contained in FRCP 23. It was plain in oral argument that the Justice 
was not buying that. First out of the gate with a question, she insisted that 
                                                                                                                           
Commc’ns Comm’n, 607 F.2d 438, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J., dissenting); see also 
United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 814 n.26 (1948) (Rutledge, J.) (“run-of-the-
mine”). Thus, the Justice’s use of “mine run” was unusually frequent, but not pathmarking. 
 47. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., 518 U.S. 415, 418–19 (1996). 
 48. Id. at 430, 431–36. 
 49. Id. at 433, 437. 
 50. Id. at 437; see also Franklin, supra note 15, at 752–54 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s 
similar approach to state-court judges). 
 51. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 25. 
 52. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 397 (2010). 
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New York’s law was “a procedural standard that has a manifestly substan-
tive purpose, which is to restrict recoveries of penalties.”53 She plaintively 
added: 
If New York wants to say this kind of claim can be brought only 
as an individual action, not as a class action, why shouldn’t the 
Federal court say that’s perfectly fine; this class of cases can’t be 
brought as a class action; we respect the State’s position on that? 
Why should we as a Federal court in a diversity case create a claim 
that the—that the State never created?54 
But the Justice did not win a majority for her view. Instead, in a 
plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held that Rule 23 
categorically allowed litigants meeting its requirements to bring a class 
action, and further that as Rule 23 was arguably procedural it governed 
under Erie.55 This categorical reading of Rule 23 was anathema to Justice 
Ginsburg. Her dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and 
Alito, faulted the Court for “read[ing] Rule 23 relentlessly to override New 
York’s restriction on the availability of statutory damages,” thereby 
“find[ing] conflict where none is necessary.”56 The better course, she 
made clear, was to “avoid[] immoderate interpretations of the Federal 
Rules that would trench on state prerogatives without serving any counter-
vailing federal interest.”57 The Justice insisted this was also the approach 
the Court had pursued in the past, and made clear through abundant 
citation that she believed that Gasperini should have controlled the 
outcome here.58 On her account, in actions governed by state law, Rule 23 
should be read as simply governing the procedural aspects of class litiga-
tion in federal court, leaving to state law the substantive determination of 
whether statutory penalties are a type of remedy that should be available 
when such representative actions are brought.59 
Nor were these opinions a fluke for the Justice. Similar sensitivity to 
respecting state substantive choices is apparent in Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent in Bush v. Gore, where she faulted some members of the Court for 
being insufficiently deferential to state court determinations of state law, 
notwithstanding that the state law determinations were of pivotal 
                                                                                                                           
 53. Shady Grove Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 2, at 4. 
 54. Id. at 6. 
 55. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398, 407–08. In a solo concurrence, Justice Stevens argued 
that a procedural federal rule could not displace a procedural state rule that the state used 
to define the scope of substantive rights and remedies under the Rules Enabling Act, but 
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436 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 437, 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 439. 
 58. Id. at 441–43; see also Merritt McAlister (@merrittm), Twitter (Sept. 18, 2020), 
https://twitter.com/merrittm/status/1307110594668003329 (on file with the Columbia Law 
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 59. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 446–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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importance to the selection of the nation’s president.60 It is equally evident 
in many of the Justice’s preemption decisions. As others have noted, 
Justice Ginsburg was often reluctant to find state law preempted, especially 
when state court actions were involved.61 In her view, just as federal courts 
should seek to accommodate state substantive interests in applying federal 
procedural rules, federal courts should find state law displaced only when 
that result was really necessary to a congressional statutory regime. 
Yet Justice Ginsburg’s sensitivity to state interests had limits, as the 
third opinion, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, reveals.62 Sprint involved 
the question of whether federal courts should abstain from hearing a 
preemption challenge to a state board’s determination so that a state court 
could review the determination first in an ongoing proceeding.63 In an 
opinion written for a unanimous Court, the Justice held that such abstention 
would be inappropriate, insisting that federal court abstention for parallel 
state proceedings should be reserved only for state criminal or quasi-
criminal proceedings or state proceedings touching on a state court’s 
ability to perform its judicial function.64 In emphasizing the restricted 
scope of abstention, the Justice emphasized the need for judicial modesty 
in the face of congressional jurisdictional choices: “Jurisdiction existing, . . . 
a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide a case is ‘virtually unflag-
ging.’”65 But equally important appeared to be recognition that accommo-
dating state interests could not come at the expense of federal courts’ 
fulfilling their function in the federal system, of which parallel state and 
federal proceedings are an essential part.66 
These three Ginsburg opinions offer an important supplement to the 
Justice’s more famous Notorious dissents. Those dissents strongly 
defended congressional authority vis-à-vis the states, insisting that the 
Court should defer to congressional judgments about how and when to 
protect individual rights against state violation and emphasizing Congress 
has “capacious power” to regulate.67 Here, Justice Ginsburg similarly 
                                                                                                                           
 60. 531 U.S. 98, 136 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 61. See Franklin, supra note 15, at 754–55. 
 62. 571 U.S. 69 (2013). 
 63. Id. at 72. 
 64. Id. at 78–79. 
 65. Id. at 77 (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 
800, 817 (1976)). 
 66. See id. at 73, 81–82. 
 67. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 602 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 
566 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It is well established that Congress’ judgement 
regarding exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
warrants substantial deference.”); Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30, 59 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (advocating for the validity of the Family and Medical Leave Act’s 
self-care provision under the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on gender 
discrimination in the workplace because “Congress’ concern was solidly grounded in 
workplace realities”). 
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underscored that federal courts should adhere to congressional choices 
on procedure and jurisdiction, and no one questioned Congress’s power 
to make those choices. But these opinions demonstrate the important 
distinction Justice Ginsburg drew between Congress having the power to 
trump state choices and Congress actually doing so. On the Justice’s 
account, the main dynamics of federal–state relations were not conflict 
and displacement but comity, complementarity, and accommodation. 
These opinions thus instruct us not to be fooled by the occasional 
constitutional blockbuster into seeing federal–state contestation as the 
norm rather than the exception. They further highlight the need to look 
at the federal court system with granularity, attentive to the multiple nodes 
of federal–state interaction and underscoring the critical role of lower 
court discretion in accommodating federal and state interests. And for 
those RBG clerks who are practitioners or professors in these areas, these 
opinions offer a frequent reminder of the Justice’s wisdom and how much 
she taught us. 
 
